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Abstract—In this paper, we propose an AC power flow based
cascading failure model that explicitly considers external weather
conditions, extreme temperatures in particular, and evaluates the
impact of extreme temperature on the initiation and propagation
of cascading blackouts. Specifically, load and dynamic line rating
changes are modeled due to temperature disturbance, the proba-
bilities for transmission line and generator outages are evaluated,
and the timing for each type of events is carefully calculated
to decide the actual event sequence. It should be emphasized
that the correlated events, in the advent of external temperature
changes, could together contribute to voltage instability. Besides,
we model undervoltage load shedding and operator re-dispatch
as control strategies for preventing the propagation of cascading
failures. The effectiveness of the proposed model is verified by
simulation results on the RTS-96 3-area system and it is found
that temperature disturbances can lead to correlated load change
and line/generator tripping, which together will greatly increase
the risk of cascading and voltage instability. Critical temperature
change, critical area with temperature disturbance, identification
of most vulnerable buses, and comparison of different control
strategies are also carefully investigated.
Index Terms—Blackout, cascading failure, correlation, extreme
temperature, extreme weather, power transmission reliability,
resilience, voltage stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
CASCADING failure is a common phenomenon in bothnatural and engineered systems, such as electric power
systems [1], natural gas systems [2], transportation networks
[3], disease transmission networks [4], and interdependent
networks [5]–[7]. For example, there have been several large-
scale blackouts, such as the 2003 U.S.-Canadian blackout [8],
the 2011 Arizona-Southern California blackout [9], and the
2012 Indian blackout [10], which have led to extensive outage
propagations and significant impacts [11]. In order to simulate
and analyze cascading failures, many models with different
levels of details have been developed [1], such as Manchester
model [12], hidden failure model [13], [14], CASCADE model
[15], OPA model [16], AC OPA model [17], dynamic model
[18], sandpile model [19], branching process model [20], [21],
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multi-type branching process model [22], the interaction model
[23]–[26], and Markovian influence graph [27].
However, the existing models mainly focus on the system
itself, usually ignoring the interactions between the system and
various external factors, such as extreme weather conditions.
These factors are important for both initiating and propagation
of cascading failures. For U.S.-Canadian blackout on August
14, 2003, the temperature was high (31◦C), causing load in-
crease in FirstEnergy’s control area, transmission line tripping
due to tree contact, and generator tripping due to increased
reactive power outputs [8]. Another blackout occurred partly
because of temperature disturbance on July 2, 1996. High
loads in Southern Idaho and Utah due to high temperature
(around 38◦C) [28], [29] led to high demands and subse-
quently highly loaded transmission lines.
In recent years, a few papers have investigated the impact
of temperature on cascading failure risks. In [30], a stochastic
model is proposed in which random line failures are generated
at constant failure rates and overloaded-line failures occur
when the line temperature reaches the equilibrium temperature.
In [31], an OPA model with slow process is proposed in which
the line temperature evolution is modeled for calculating the
line length and sag changes in order to evaluate the possibility
for tree contact or damage. In [32], a PRA model is developed
to consider the impact of wind speed and the evolution of
line temperature. In [33], risk assessment of weather-related
cascading outages is presented based on weather-dependent
outage rates. In [34], historical outage data is used to estimate
the effects of weather on cascading failure and bulk statistics
of historical initial line outages are provided. However, all
these existing models have the following problems.
1) The initiating events are still generated by random sam-
pling, which does not consider the important geograph-
ical correlations of the initiating events due to external
weather conditions such as temperature disturbance.
2) The ambient temperature disturbance at various geo-
graphical locations in the system is not explicitly mod-
eled, and the consequent demand changes and dynamic
rating changes are not modeled, which, however, are
very critical for understanding the initiating and prop-
agation of cascading failures especially due to loss of
voltage stability.
Therefore, in order to better understand cascading failure it
is needed to develop a model that could explicitly consider the
ambient temperature disturbances and their impacts on system
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operation and cascading failure risks. The contributions of this
paper are listed below.
1) We develop a cascading failure model that explicitly
considers ambient temperature disturbances and the sub-
sequent demand change and dynamic line rating changes
to take into account the correlations between different
events such as line outage, generator tripping, and under-
voltage of load buses, and models the control strategies
against failure propagation such as undervoltage load
shedding and operator re-dispatch.
2) Based on the developed cascading failure model we
provide an explanation about why the failure can still
be initiated and propagated even when the power system
is initially N − 1 secure by considering the impact of
ambient temperature disturbances and the correlations
between different events.
3) We perform risk assessment for power systems based on
the developed model to investigate critical temperature
change and critical area with temperature disturbance
that could lead to significantly increased risk of cascad-
ing, identify the most vulnerable buses for temperature
disturbances, and evaluate the effectiveness of different
control strategies on reducing the system risk.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses ambient temperature disturbance, models load and
line rating changes due to temperature change, and evaluates
the probability of transmission line and generator tripping.
Control strategies including undervoltage load shedding and
operator re-dispatch are modeled in Section III. Section IV
determines the timing of different types of events, and Section
V introduces voltage stability margin calculation. In Section
VI the proposed blackout model is summarized. Section VII
tests and validates the proposed model on the RTS-96 3-area
system. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
II. AMBIENT TEMPERATURE IN BLACKOUT MODELING
Assume there are n buses in a power system, including
a slack bus that is numbered as is. The vector of ambient
temperatures of all buses is T = [T1, T2, · · · , Tn]>. The vector
of ambient temperatures of the load buses is denoted by T SL .
For a transmission line l : i → j that connects bus i and bus
j and crosses M areas, its ambient temperature is assumed to
be dependent on the temperatures of the M areas.
A. Temperature Disturbance
An ambient temperature disturbance is applied to an area
A = [φ, φ] × [λ, λ]. In order to make sure at least one load
bus is inside the chosen area, we randomly select one of the
load buses and choose an area around this bus. The chosen
area is set as φ = φc − ∆φ, φ = φc + ∆φ, λ = λc − ∆λ,
and λ = λc + ∆λ where ∆φ > 0 and ∆λ > 0 determine how
widespread the disturbance is and are chosen as
∆φ = γ(φmax − φmin) (1)
∆λ = γ(λmax − λmin). (2)
As a disturbance the ambient temperature of the load buses
in the selected subsystem is changed by ∆T . Obviously the
ambient temperature of the transmission lines in the selected
subsystem will also change by ∆T . For a line l : i → j that
crosses the boundary of the selected area and lies in M areas,
its length in area k with ambient temperature of Tk is dk and
its temperature is determined by
Tij =
1
Dij
M∑
k=1
Tkdk, (3)
where bus i is assumed to be inside the selected area while
bus j is not and Dij is the distance between buses i and j.
As a simple case, for a line l : i → j that only crosses two
areas, its temperature is given as
Tij =
d1
Dij
Ti +
d2
Dij
Tj , (4)
where d1 is the length of the line in the selected area and d2
is the length of the line out of the selected area. Then with a
∆T change for bus i the ambient temperature of the line will
change by
∆Tij =
d1
Dij
∆T. (5)
For calculating the distance between two buses, with specific
latitude and longitude, we assumes that the earth is a sphere
with a radius of 6378 km. We calculate the distance by using
haversine formula in (6)–(9) [35]. Let the central angle Θ
between two buses i and j be:
Θ =
Dij
R
. (6)
The haversine formula (hav of Θ) is:
hav(Θ) = hav(∆φdi,j) + cosφi cosφj hav(∆λ
d
i,j), (7)
and the haversine function of an angle θ is:
hav(θ) = sin2
(
θ
2
)
. (8)
Finally, by applying the inverse haversine hav−1 to the
central angle Θ, we can find the distance Dij as
Dij = 2R sin
−1
(√
sin2
∆φdi,j
2
+ cosφi cosφj sin
2
∆λdi,j
2
)
.
Note that a relatively large ambient temperature change
could take a few hours during which some protections may
operate. However, from the modeling perspective it may be
too complicated if we consider the temporal behavior of the
ambient temperature change and its impact on the risk of
cascading failures. Therefore, in this paper we consider a
simplified scenario in which the ambient temperature change
happens immediately and we focus more on what impact it
will have on system operation and cascading failure risks.
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Fig. 1. Relationship between normalized electricity demand and
temperature for the Greek power system based on daily data for the
period 1/1/1993–12/31/2003 [37], [38].
B. Load Change under Temperature Disturbances
In power systems, load forecasting is used for day-ahead
generation purchases and reactive power management. How-
ever, due to uncertainties the actual load may be different from
the forecasted load. For example, several large operators in the
Midwest consistently under-forecasted the load levels between
August 11 and 14, 2003 [8]. In this paper we assume T 0 is
used for day-ahead load forecasting while the actual ambient
temperature for a subsystem is T 0 + ∆T which will lead to a
deviation of actual load from forecasted load.
The real power of a load bus i changes with its ambient
temperature Ti as
Pi = LPi(Ti)P
0
i . (9)
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that
LPi(Ti) = L(Ti) where the same function L is used for all
buses.
According to [36]–[38], L(Ti) can be represented by a
polynomial function as L(Ti) = a3Ti3 + a2Ti2 + a1Ti + a0.
Fig. 1 shows the fitted L function for the Greek intercon-
nected power system based on data between January 1, 1993
and December 31, 2003 [37], [38]. It is seen that the variation
of load with temperature is nonlinear and asymmetrically
increasing for decreased or increased temperatures with a
minimum at around Tmin = 18.5◦C [37], [38]. The load is
more sensitive to higher temperature increase than to lower
temperature decrease, mainly because several energy sources
such as diesel, natural gas, electricity can be used for heating
while practically only electricity can be used for cooling [37],
[38]. A similar curve can be found in [36]. Assume the initial
load to be the ambient temperature that leads to L(T ) = 1.
For example, if we use the curve in Fig. 1 there will be
two corresponding positive ambient temperatures, which are
T 0low = 9.91
◦C and T 0high = 24.21
◦C, respectively. If we
want to explore the effect of temperature increase (decrease),
we will assume that the ambient temperature corresponding to
the initial load is T 0 = T 0high (T
0 = T 0low).
Under high/low temperatures, there will be more air condi-
tioning loads which consume more reactive power and have
lower power factors than other types of load [8]. In order to
take this into account, we assume that the power factor linearly
decreases with the temperature increase as
pfi =
{
pf0i − kpfi (Ti − T 0), if T 0 = T 0high, Ti ≥ Tmin
pf0i + k
pf
i (Ti − T 0), if T 0 = T 0low, Ti ≤ Tmin,
Then the reactive power of load bus i under temperature Ti
can be obtained as:
Qi = Pi tan
(
cos−1(pfi)
)
. (10)
C. Dynamic Line Rating
Assume the initial rating of a transmission line l : i → j,
is determined for T 0ij = (T
0
i + T
0
j )/2. When we study the
scenario for high temperature, T 0ij = T
0
high = 24.21
◦C. This
is consistent with the fact that the approximate current carrying
capacity is usually given for 25◦C [39].
The dynamic rating of a line can depend on ambient temper-
ature [40] and utility management vegetation [31]. According
to [40], the effect of ambient temperature on dynamic rating
expressed in Ampere is quasi linear. Therefore, for dynamic
rating expressed in apparent power (MVA) we have
F
d
ij = V
rated
ij Vij(−kijTij + cij). (11)
Different conductors may have different slopes kij . For ex-
ample, the slope for the AMS570 conductor is approximately
0.02 kA/◦C [40]. For simplicity, in this paper we use the same
slope kij = 0.02 kA/◦C for all lines. Then cij can be easily
obtained as cij = F
0
ij/(V
rated
ij V
0
ij) + kijT
0
ij .
In order to consider utility vegetation management and the
corresponding risk for line tripping due to a slow process in-
volving transmission line temperature evolution, sag increase,
and tree contact [31], we modify (11) to be
F
d
ij = αijV
rated
ij Vij(−kijTij + cij), (12)
where αij is uniformly sampled in [α, 1] with 0 < α ≤ 1.
When αij = 1, the dynamic rating is only determined
by ambient temperature. Otherwise, the dynamic rating will
decrease.
D. Probability of Line Tripping
For a line l : i → j, let Rij(T ) = Fij(T SL)/F
d
ij(Tij).
Note that Fij is a function of the ambient temperatures of the
load buses and will change when there is a load change at any
load bus due to ambient temperature change. By contrast, the
dynamic line rating F
d
ij is only a function of the local ambient
temperature of the line l : i→ j.
The tripping probability of the line can be written as a
function of Rij :
P tripij = ft
(
Rij(T )
)
. (13)
In this paper we propose the function shown in Fig. 2 for
tripping probability of the line, which can be written as
ft =

p1, if Rij ≤ 1
a1e
b1Rij , if 1 < Rij ≤ 1 + 
a2e
b2Rij , if 1 +  < Rij ≤ K
p3, if Rij > K,
(14)
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Fig. 2. Probability of line tripping as a function of Rij .
where b1 = (ln p1 − ln p2)/(−), a1 = p1/eb1 , b2 = (ln p2 −
ln p3)/(1 +  − K), and a2 = p2/eb2(1+). When Rij ≤ 1,
although there is no slow process involved a line may still
be tripped by a small probability, by which we can take into
account the factors that could lead to line tripping even if the
dynamic line rating is not reached. For example, even if Fij
is far below F dij the line may be tripped by the protection due
to lighting strikes, then the probability of line tripping is not
equal zero, but is equal to a constant low value to describe a
probability of the tripping of a line exposed to a hidden failure.
Once Rij > 1 it becomes possible for the line to be tripped
such as due to tree contact or overheating and the probability
of tripping thus quickly grows to a much higher value p2 at
Rij = 1 + . Then between 1 +  and K the probability of
tripping increases exponentially with parameters a2 and b2.
Finally, it reaches to a high probability p3 ≤ 1 when Rij is
greater than K. In this paper we choose p3 to be 1.
E. Probability of Generator Tripping
The active power change due to the ambient temperature
change is ∆P =
∑
i∈SAL
(Pi−P0i ). This change will be supplied
by all generators in proportion to their active power reserve.
Specifically, for i ∈ SG\is we have
Pi = P
0
i +
Pi − P0i∑
i∈SG
(Pi − P0i )
∆P. (15)
When reactive load is increased, the generators nearby
will have to provide more reactive power. For example, in
2003 U.S.-Canadian blackout, Eastlake unit 5 in FirstEnergy’s
Northern Ohio service area was generating high reactive
power, because there were significant reactive power supply
problems in the states of Indiana and Ohio. Due to high
reactive output and over-excitation, this unit was tripped [8].
Automatic voltage regulator is assumed to be equipped for
each generator to hold the terminal voltages. Since normally
there is no automatic control action limiting the reactive power
output of generators [41], the reactive power of a generator can
be beyond the allowed capacity range [Q
i
,Qi] due to voltage
regulation to relieve the overvoltage or undervoltage violations
close to the generator. In this paper we consider the increased
possibility of generator tripping due to overexcitation limiter
Fig. 3. Probability of generator tripping as a function of Qi.
operation. The tripping probability of the generator i can be
written as a function of Qi as:
P tripi = fg
(
Qi
)
. (16)
In this paper we propose the following function:
fg =

p6, if Qi ≤ KQi
a3e
b3Qi , if KQi < Qi ≤ Qi − 
a4e
b4Qi , if Q
i
−  < Qi ≤ Qi
p4, if Qi < Qi ≤ Qi
a5e
b5Qi , if Qi < Qi ≤ Qi + 
a6e
b6Qi , if Qi +  < Qi ≤ KQi
p6, if Qi > KQi ,
(17)
where b3 = (ln p6− ln p5)/(KQi −Qi + ), a3 = p6/e
b3KQi ,
b4 = (ln p5 − ln p4)/(−), a4 = p5/eb4(Qi−), b5 = (ln p4 −
ln p5)/(−), a5 = p4/eb5Qi , b6 = (ln p5 − ln p6)/(Qi +
 − KQi), and a6 = p5/eb6(Qi+). If the reactive power of
any generator i lies in [Q
i
,Qi], it fails only by a very small
probability p4 in order to model any accidental failure. When
Qi falls out of [Qi,Qi], the probability for generator tripping
quickly grows to a much higher value p5 at Qi−  or Qi + .
Then from Q
i
− to KQi or from Qi+ to KQi , the probability
of tripping increases exponentially with parameters a3, b3 and
a6, b6, respectively. Finally when Qi ≤ KQi or Qi > KQi it
reaches a high probability p6 for the most abnormal cases.
III. MODELING PROTECTION AND CONTROL STRATEGIES
A. Undervoltage Load Shedding
When the voltage of a load bus i is below a threshold Vth
for more than τ seconds, a portion of the real power load
will be shed [42]. The amount of active power to be shed is
determined as:
∆Pshi = min(Ksh∆Vi,Pi), (18)
where ∆Vi = Vth − Vi > 0. In this paper, the parameters
are chosen as Vth = 0.9 pu, Ksh = 600 MW/pu, and τ = 3
seconds. In order to preserve the power factor, the reactive
power to be shed is calculated as [43]:
∆Qshi = Qi
∆Pshi
Pi
. (19)
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B. Operator Re-Dispatch
Note that the operator only has the initial branch flow
capacity F
0
ij . If the branch flow is greater than the dynamic
rating but smaller than F
0
ij , the operator will not perform any
re-dispatch. Only when the line flow is higher than F
0
ij , will
the operator be able to perform a shift-factor (S) based re-
dispatch, which well reflects the actual operator behavior.
Assume branch i → j is overloaded, i.e. Fij > F 0ij .
We select n+ generators {GP1 ,GP2 , · · · ,GPn+} with positive
shift factors and n− generators {GN1 ,GN2 , · · · ,GNn−} with
negative shift factors. For the generators with positive shift
factors, without loss of generality, we assume
SP1 ≥ SP2 ≥ · · · ≥ SPn+ . (20)
To reduce the line overloading most effectively, the gener-
ators with positive shift factors should be dispatched (i.e.,
decreasing their outputs) in the order of GP1 ,GP2 , · · · ,GPn+ .
Specifically, for generator GPi , i = 1, · · · , n+, its real power
output is re-dispatched as:
PPi = P
0
Pi +
η(F
0
ij − Fij)
SPi
. (21)
If the generators with positive shift factors cannot eliminate
the overloading, the generators with negative shift factors will
be re-dispatched. Without loss of generality, we assume
SN1 ≤ SN2 ≤ · · · ≤ SNn− . (22)
These generators are dispatched (i.e., increasing their outputs)
in the order of GN1 ,GN2 , · · · ,GNn− by a similar approach
to that for the generators with positive shift factors.
If there are multiple overloaded branches, the above re-
dispatch will be applied to each of them according to Fij/F 0ij .
The larger Fij/F 0ij of a branch is, the earlier the overloading of
this branch will be dealt with by the re-dispatch of generators.
If necessary, multiple rounds of re-dispatch will be executed
until the overloading of all branches is eliminated or the
number of rounds reaches a limit.
IV. TIMING OF EVENTS
Define a set of events for the (k + 1)th iteration as E =
{e1, e2, · · · , em} where m is the number of potential events
that could happen in iteration k+ 1. The events could be low
voltage of a load bus, tripping of a line whose Fij could be
smaller or greater than its dynamic rating F
d
ij , tripping of a
generator whose reactive power output is within/outside its
lower and upper limits. Each type of events will fail after a
specific amount of time which will be decided as follows.
As mentioned in Section III-A, when the voltage of a load
bus i is below a pre-defined threshold for more than τ = 3 s,
we shed ∆Pshi and ∆Q
sh
i of load at bus i. The re-dispatch in
Section III-B is assumed to be be finished in one minute.
If a line whose Fij is smaller than its dynamic rating F
d
ij
is tripped, there is no slow process involved and the line is
disconnected by the protective relay after a very short time,
which may include the relay operating time and the breaker
operating time. We consider this time as 0.2 s [39], [44].
When Fij ≥ F dij , the line may be tripped for different
reasons, such as tree contact caused by a slow process [8],
[31], overheating, or mis-operation of zone 2 and zone 3
distance relays [8]. The time of line tripping under different
mechanisms can vary significantly. For example, in the 2003
U.S.-Canadian blackout the Stuart-Atlanta 345-kV line trip-
ping took 31 minutes due to tree contact. The backup zone 2
and zone 3 relay, however, can operate in a few seconds. The
probability of a line with Fij ≥ F dij to fail can be determined
based on Section II-D. If such a line l : i → j is to fail,
it fails when its total accumulated overload exceeds a limit
o¯ij which represents the condition required for line tripping
due to a number of processes such as the overheating of a
transmission line or the sagging of the line to vegetation [31],
[45]. Let ∆oij,0 = 0. The time for line l : i → j whose Fij
is greater than F
d
ij in iteration k + 1 can be calculated as:
∆tij,k+1 =
o¯ij −
∑k
m=0 ∆oij,m
Fij(tk)− F dij(tk)
, (23)
where the limit o¯ij is chosen so that a branch will trip after
20 seconds of being 50% above the branch flow limit.
According to [41], generators usually have about 10 to 20%
overload capability for up to 30 minutes. We use a similar
approach to determine the time for generator tripping in every
interval. When the reactive power of a generator g is in
[Q
g
,Qg], it fails by a very small probability p1 because of
accidental failure. For these types of failures, we consider the
time as 0.2 second [46]. If the reactive power of generator g
moves out of [Q
g
,Qg], the probability for that generator to
fail can also be determined by Section II-E. If the generator
is to fail, the time that is required for this generator to fail in
iteration k + 1 can be calculated as
∆tg,k+1 =

o¯g−
∑k
m=0 ∆og,m
Q
g
−Qg(tk) , if Qg < Qg
o¯g−
∑k
m=0 ∆og,m
Qg(tk)−Qg
, if Qg > Qg,
(24)
where the threshold o¯g is chosen so that a generator will trip
after 30 minutes of being 20% above/below the upper/lower
reactive power limit and og,0 = 0.
Let ∆tmink+1 be the minimum time of all events in iteration
k + 1, and can be calculated as
∆tmink+1 = min
{
t(ei), i = 1, · · · ,m
}
, (25)
where t(ei) is the time for event ei and the time corresponding
to the next event is thus tk+1 = tk + ∆tmink+1.
The ∆oij at iteration k + 1 can be obtained by [45]:
∆oij,k+1 = max
(
Fij(tk)− F dij(tk), 0
)
∆tmink+1, (26)
and ∆og at iteration k + 1 can be calculated as
∆og,k+1 =

(
Q
g
−Qg(tk)
)
∆tmink+1, if Qg < Qg(
Qg(tk)−Qg
)
∆tmink+1, if Qg > Qg.
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V. VOLTAGE STABILITY MARGIN CALCULATION
Voltage instability has been responsible for several major
blackouts, such as New York Power Pool disturbance on
September 22, 1970 and Western systems coordination council
(WSCC) transmission system disturbance on July 2, 1996.
A system enters a state of voltage instability when a distur-
bance, such as a load increase or change in system conditions,
causes a progressive and uncontrollable decline in voltage. In
blackouts, the load increase due to temperature disturbance
and the reactive power supply decrease due to the increased
probability of tripping of the lines and generators that are
geographically close to the load increase area both contribute
to voltage instability. More importantly, the load increase and
the increase of line tripping probability are correlated and both
are related to the temperature disturbance, which may greatly
increase the risk of cascading.
After each change in the operating condition, we calculate
the voltage stability margin based on the QV index proposed
in [47]. Specifically, for a power flow model[
∆P
∆Q
]
=
[
JPθ JPV
JQθ JQV
] [
∆θ
∆V
]
, (27)
letting ∆P = 0 we have
∆θ = −J−1Pθ JPV∆V. (28)
Substituting (28) into the ∆Q equations in (27) we have
∆Q =
(
JQV − JQθJ−1Pθ JPV
)
∆V. (29)
Let JR = JQV − JQθJ−1Pθ JPV and a voltage stability index
(VSI) for the whole system can be defined as
VSI = min
{
det(JR)[
adj(JR)
]
ii
, i = 1, ..., N
}
, (30)
where N is the nubmer of buses, adj(A) = det(A)A−1,
and det(A) is the determinant of A. The VSI can be used
to indicate how close the system is to voltage instability.
The bigger VSI is, the more stable the system is. When VSI
approaches zero the system will lose voltage stability [47].
VI. PROPOSED BLACKOUT MODEL
Fig. 4 illustrates the proposed cascading failure model which
can be implemented in the following ten steps.
1) Randomly select a load bus and an area around the
selected load bus based on Section II-A. Increase the
ambient temperature of the selected area by ∆T .
2) Increase the loads of the buses inside the selected area
based on Section II-B and adjust the generators’ real
power setpoints based on (15) in Section II-E.
3) Calculate dynamic ratings of the lines inside the selected
area and the boundary lines by (12) in Section II-C.
4) Run power flow. If the power flow cannot converge, go
to Step 10; if the power flow converges but there is no
voltage stability margin as defined in (30), go to Step
10. Otherwise, go to Step 5.
5) Check the voltage of the load buses and the load for
the load buses whose voltages are less than Vth is to be
shed based on Section III-A.
6) Check line flows. If there is any line whose line flow
Fij is greater than its initial rating F 0ij , the generators
are to be re-dispatched based on Section III-B.
7) Find the probabilities of line tripping from Section II-D
and generator tripping from Section II-E and decide the
lines and generators that will be tripped.
8) Calculate the time for each event according to Section
IV. The event from Steps 5–7 that has the minimum
time will actually happen.
9) If any event occurs, go back to Step 4; otherwise, go to
Step 10.
10) Stop the simulation.
By utilizing our proposed model, we can realistically model
cascading failures and capture what has happened in previous
blackouts. Even though the system is N −1 secure, cascading
failure can still be initiated and then propagates in a large area
of the system. This is mainly due to the following reasons.
1) Although load forecasting is used for day-ahead gen-
eration purchases and reactive power management, due
to uncertainties such as unexpected temperature distur-
bances the actual load may be different from the fore-
casted load, thus changing system operating conditions.
2) Under different weather conditions the actual line rating
could change significantly due to a number of processes
such as the overheating of a transmission line or the
sagging of the line to vegetation. An N−1 secure system
under initial line ratings may not still be N − 1 secure
under the reduced dynamic line ratings such as due to
temperature increases.
3) The initiating events have important geographical cor-
relations due to external weather conditions such as
temperature disturbance. Temperature increase can cause
increased line flow by load increase and line rating
decrease at the same time, greatly increasing the prob-
ability of tripping of lines inside or on the boundary
of an area with temperature disturbances. Generators
inside the area with temperature disturbance also have
increased chance of being disconnected due to load
increase and also reduction of reactive supply from the
outside system after tie line disconnection. Our cascad-
ing failure model can take into account the correlations
between different events such as line outage, generator
tripping, and undervoltage of load buses, which may lead
to extensive outage propagation even if the system is ini-
tially N−1 secure without any temperature disturbance.
VII. RESULTS
The proposed model is implemented in Matlab for the RTS-
96 3-area system [48] based on MATPOWER [49]. There are
73 buses and 120 branches in the system, and the total load is
8550 MW. Compared to the initial model, each reactor of 100
MVAr at buses 106, 206, and 306 is split into two, 50 MVAr
at each extremity of the cable. These reactors are considered
to be automatically disconnected in case of the outage of the
corresponding cable. The pre-contingency steady state is based
on a Preventive-Security-Constrained Optimal Power Flow so
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Fig. 4. Flowchart of the proposed blackout model.
that the system is N −1 secure1 [50]. All tests are carried out
on a 3.20 GHz Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8700 based desktop.
A. Parameter Settings
We set kpf = 0.001 for all buses [8], K = 1.5 in Section
II-D for lines [51], KQi in Section II-E as 1.5Qi if Qi < 0
and as −0.5 if Q
i
= 0, and KQi as 1.5Qi. Besides,  is chosen
as 0.01 for lines [51], and  = −0.01Q
i
and  = 0.01Qi for
generators. We choose p1 = 0.001, p2 = 0.3, and p3 = 1
[51]. For generators we choose p4 = 0.001 to consider hidden
failures, p5 = 0.3, and p6 = 1. For re-dispatch we set η = 1.05
[52]. For calculating dynamic line rating, we consider αij = 1.
B. Typical Simulation Run without Operator Re-Dispatch
Buses 207 and 208 are selected as the internal buses and
their initial temperatures are set to be T 0high = 24.21
◦C. As a
temperature disturbance, we increase the temperature of the
selected area to T = T 0high + 10
◦C. As in Table I, after
temperature increase the active and reactive powers at these
two buses also increase. The line flows and the dynamic line
ratings of the boundary and internal branches are listed in
Table II. After temperature rise the line flows increase while
F
d
ij decreases compared to F
0
ij , and branches 207–208 and
208–209 become overloaded.
If dynamic line rating is not considered, Fij(Tij) for all
lines are less than F
0
ij and the probability for line tripping
1http://homepages.ulb.ac.be/∼phenneau/CFWG Benchmark.HTML
TABLE I
INTERNAL BUSES WITH THEIR ACTIVE AND REACTIVE POWERS IN
THE TYPICAL CASE WITHOUT OPERATOR RE-DISPATCH
Inside
buses
P(T 0i )
(MW)
P(Ti)
(MW)
Q(T 0i )
(MVAr)
Q(Ti)
(MVAr)
207 125 189.79 25 48.08
208 171 259.63 35 66.76
TABLE II
INITIAL FLOWS, FLOW AFTER TEMPERATURE RISES, AND
DYNAMIC LINE RATING OF BOUNDARY AND INTERNAL BRANCHES
IN THE TYPICAL CASE WITHOUT OPERATOR RE-DISPATCH
Branch Fij(T 0ij) F
0
ij Fij(Tij) F
d
ij(Tij)
(207, 208) 53.24 175 148.89 147.40
(208, 209) 96.41 190 175.07 173.21
(208, 210) 82.77 190 161.81 173.45
202
301
222
201
210
204 205
209
208
117
212
211
315
313
314
223 213
207
120
206
214
215217 224
203
218
221
216
107
108
123 113119
112
111 104
106
105
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101
109
124 103
118
114
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116
115
122323
318
325
312
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322321
316
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305
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307
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2226
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10
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9
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39
36
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11
16
3
2
25
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Generator bus
Load bus
Connection bus
Line tr ipping
324
42
32
Generator tr ipping
33
29
28
27
Fig. 5. Process of a typical blackout in RTS-96 system simulated by
the proposed model without operator re-dispatch.
is as low as p1 and the probability for generator tripping is
equal to p4. However, if dynamic line rating is considered,
things will be totally different. When operator re-dispatch is
not modeled, the event sequence simulated from the proposed
model is shown in Fig. 5, in which line tripping is indicated
by red dash lines, generator tripping is indicated by green dash
circles, and the number next to the tripped line or generator
indicate the sequence of the event. After the temperature of
the selected area increases, branch 207–208 will be tripped by
probability 0.3. In our simulation it is tripped after 991.40 s.
This leads to undervoltage of bus 208 and the islanding of the
generators at bus 207. Then the cascading gradually propagates
to the other parts of the system, leading to a total of 35 line
outages and tripping of 19 generator at 12 generator buses.
The line outages, generator outages, and undervoltage buses
during the blackout are shown in Fig. 6.
The total load during the blackout is shown in Fig. 7(a).
Three seconds after the first line tripping, part of the load at
bus 208 is shed due to undervoltage. Due to islanding and
undervoltage, load shedding becomes much faster after 8036
seconds. The VSI during the cascading event is shown in
Fig. 7(b). Under normal operating conditions VSI is 14.68,
and when the blackout propagates it gradually decreases. At
11454.2 s, VSI decreases from 2.02 to 1.39. Fig. 7(c) shows
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Fig. 6. The events for the typical case without operator re-dispatch.
For generator outages the involved generator buses are shown. Since
one generator bus can have several generators connected to it, it may
appear more than once, such as generator bus 201.
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Fig. 7. Total load, VSI, and voltage at vulnerable buses for the typical
case without operator re-dispatch: (a) Total load; (b) VSI; (c) Voltage
at vulnerable buses.
the voltages of four vulnerable buses (buses 303, 305, 306, and
324) over time. It is seen that after the VSI reduces to 1.39
the voltages at the vulnerable buses begin to drop significantly
before voltage collapse finally occurs at 12657 s.
C. Typical Simulation Run with Operator Re-Dispatch
In this case, buses 304, 305, 306, 309, 310, and 314 are
chosen as the internal buses and their initial temperatures
are T 0high = 24.21
◦C. The temperature of the selected area
is raised to T = T 0high + 10
◦C to simulate a temperature
disturbance. As shown in Table III, the active and reactive
powers at the internal buses increase due to temperature rise.
The line flows and dynamic line ratings of the boundary and
internal branches are reported in Table IV. It is easily seen
that the line flow of branch 314–316 becomes higher than its
dynamic line rating and is to be tripped by probability 0.32.
In our simulation, it is tripped after 798.34 s and initiates
a cascading failure. The event sequence simulated from the
proposed model with operator re-dispatch is illustrated in Fig.
8, in which the selected area is denoted by blue dash lines,
line tripping is denoted by red dash lines, generator tripping
is specified by green dash circles, and the number next to the
tripped line or generator indicates the sequence of the event.
The tripping of line 314–316 leads to the overloading of line
312–323 which is tripped after 54.2 s. These events result in
the undervolatge of buses 303, 309, and 324 at 855.54 s and
the overloading of line 313–323 at 915.54 s. The operator re-
dispatch at 975.54 s eliminates the overloading of line 313–
323, but the generator at bus 314 within the selected area
is tripped at 2415.75 s due to over-excitation and cascading
failure spreads to the other parts of the system, causing a
total of 19 line outages and the tripping of 14 generators
at 11 generator buses. The operator re-dispatch, line outages,
generator outages, and undervoltage buses during the blackout
are illustrated in Fig. 9.
TABLE III
INTERNAL BUSES WITH THEIR ACTIVE AND REACTIVE POWERS IN
THE TYPICAL CASE WITH OPERATOR RE-DISPATCH
Inside
buses
P(T 0i )
(MW)
P(Ti)
(MW)
Q(T 0i )
(MVAr)
Q(Ti)
(MVAr)
304 74 112.4 15 29.9
305 71 107.8 14 27.4
306 141 214.1 28 54.7
309 175 265.7 36 69.5
310 195 296.1 40 77.3
314 194 294.6 39 75.9
TABLE IV
INITIAL FLOWS, FLOW AFTER TEMPERATURE RISES, AND
DYNAMIC LINE RATING OF BOUNDARY AND INTERNAL BRANCHES
IN THE TYPICAL CASE WITH OPERATOR RE-DISPATCH
Branch Fij(T 0ij) F
0
ij Fij(Tij) F
d
ij(Tij)
(305, 301) 48.3 175 88.1 167.7
(304, 302) 39.4 175 67.3 172.5
(306, 302) 41.1 175 66.5 160.2
(309, 303) 20.8 175 40.9 158.4
(304, 309) 49.2 175 82.7 147.4
(305, 310) 25.3 175 47.4 147.4
(306, 310) 150.4 180 151.6 152.4
(309, 308) 97.4 190 81.8 174.3
(309, 311) 146.5 400 191.1 352.5
(309, 312) 165.1 400 211.2 353.7
(310, 311) 193.4 400 266.3 351.3
(310, 312) 216.5 400 288.2 342.5
(314, 316) 354.7 500 498.5 492.4
The total load during the blackout is shown in Fig. 10(a).
After two line trippings, undervoltage happens at buses 303,
309, and 324, and part of the load at these buses is shed due
to undervoltage. The VSI during the cascading event is shown
in Fig. 10(b). At 5378.5 s, VSI drops from 2.72 to 0.97. Fig.
10(c) illustrates the voltages of eight vulnerable buses (buses
303, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, and 324), some of which are
inside the selected area. It is noticed that after VSI declines
to 0.97 the voltages at the vulnerable buses begin to drop
remarkably before voltage eventually collapses at 5381.5 s.
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Fig. 8. Process of a typical blackout in RTS-96 system when operator
re-dispatch is modeled.
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generator outages the involved generator buses are shown.
0 1 2 3 4 5
103
0
5
10
15
103
(a)
0 1 2 3 4 5
103
0
5
10
15
(b)
0 1 2 3 4 5
103
0.6
0.8
1
(c)
Fig. 10. Total load, VSI, and voltage at vulnerable buses for the
typical case with operator re-dispatch: (a) Total load; (b) VSI; (c)
Voltage at vulnerable buses.
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Fig. 11. Average value and standard deviations of the number of
outages for different number of simulations: (a) Average value; (b)
Standard deviation.
D. Number of Simulations
Since many random factors could affect cascading failure
simulation, we set γ = 0.07, ∆T = 11◦C and run the model
for different times in order to decide a number for which the
variance of the simulation results is small enough. Fig. 11
shows the average value and the standard deviation of the
number of outages for different number of simulations. It is
seen that after 10,000 simulations the average value of outages
(both line outages and generator outages) stabilizes and the
standard deviation of the number of outages decreases to a
very small value. For the other parameters of γ and ∆T results
are very similar and are thus not given. Therefore, in this paper
we run our model for 10,000 times for each case.
E. Impact of Temperature Disturbances and Size of the Se-
lected Area
We set γ = 0.07 and run the proposed model for 10,000
times with randomly selected areas, in which the ambient
temperature is increased from T 0high or decreased from T
0
low
by ∆T . Fig. 12 shows the average value of the number of
outages under different temperature disturbances. It is seen
that when increasing the temperature the total number of line
and generator outages are low when ∆T ≤ 11◦C, and will
grow quickly when ∆T > 11◦C. Therefore, ∆T = 11◦C
can be inferred as the critical temperature disturbance. As
presented in Fig. 12b, if the temperature is decreased, while
the load is increased the dynamic line rating is also increased.
Therefore, the total number of line and generator outages is
always low. Fig. 13 shows the total load shed for three different
temperature increase disturbances and it is seen that the total
load shed increases under larger temperature disturbances.
We also analyze the impact of the size of the selected
area for temperature increase cases with ∆T = 11◦C, and
a random area is selected with a different value of γ. As the
results in Fig. 14 indicate, by enlarging the selected area, the
number of line and generator outages increases. The number of
line and generator outages significantly increases for γ > 0.07.
Therefore, γ = 0.07 can be inferred as the critical size.
Fig. 15 shows the pairs of critical temperature increase
disturbances and critical area sizes. It can be seen that as
the critical size of the selected area increases the critical
temperature disturbance decreases.
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Fig. 12. Average value of the number of outages under different
temperature disturbances: (a) Increasing temperature; (b) Decreasing
temperature.
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F. Identifying the Most Vulnerable Buses/Locations
The vulnerability of the buses/locations is dependent on
the temperature disturbance and size of the selected area.
For this reason, for effectively identifying the most vul-
nerable locations, we run the model 10000 times for all
combinations of ∆T = {8◦C, 10◦C, 11◦C, 15◦C} and γ =
{0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08} around every load bus. By doing so
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Fig. 16. Identification of vulnerable buses: (a) Average value of the
number of outages for load buses; (b) Ratio between the load shed
and the total load for load buses.
we can identify the vulnerable buses under very diverse failure
scenarios. Fig. 16 shows the simulation results. Fig. 16a shows
the average value of the number of line and generator outages
and Fig. 16b shows the average value of the ratio between the
load shed and the total load. We can see that the load buses
208, 308, 305, 210, 209, 306, 309, and 310 are more vulner-
able than the other buses, and the temperature disturbances
around these buses lead to much more line/generator outages
and load shed.
G. Impact of Control Strategies
For the typical case presented in Section VII-B, if the
operator re-dispatch is modeled by considering the initial
line rating, at 8972 s the operator re-dispatch is performed
because the power flow of some branches exceeds their initial
capacities and the potential outage of line 209-211 would
take 104.4 s which is longer than 60 s, the time required
for operator re-dispatch. After the operator re-dispatch the
cascading failure stops.
Besides, we set ∆T = 11◦C, γ = 0.07 and run simulations
for 10,000 times for the cases with or without considering
operator re-dispatch. Fig. 17 shows the distributions of the
number of line and generator outages. It is clear that by imple-
menting the re-dispatch strategy using F 0ij , the number of line
and generator outages is decreased. Besides, by considering
dynamic line rating for re-dispatch, the risk can be reduced
much more significantly.
100 101
10-4
10-2
100
(a)
100 101
10-4
10-2
100
(b)
Fig. 17. Distribution of the number of line and generator outages with
or without re-dispatch. (a) Line outage (b) Generator outage.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a blackout model that considers load change
and dynamic line rate change due to ambient temperature
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disturbance is proposed. We apply the proposed model to the
RTS-96 3-area system and find that temperature disturbance
can lead to correlated load change and line tripping, which will
together contribute to voltage collapse. Based on the developed
model we identified critical temperature change, critical area
with temperature disturbance, and most vulnerable buses, and
compare the effectiveness of different control strategies.
In this paper the major mechanisms that could lead to the
initiating and propagation of cascading failures are the load
increase and line rating decrease caused by ambient tem-
perature disturbances, the coupling between different events
such as line outages, generator outages, and undervoltage
of load buses, and also the consequent voltage collapse. As
the penetration of renewable generation is quickly increasing,
the future power system will be even more impacted by
external factors such as weather conditions. This is because
compared with traditional fossil fuel based generation the
renewable, mostly power electronics interfaced generation
depends more on weather conditions, and is more sensitive to
the system disturbances such as voltage disturbances caused
by transmission outages due to lightning or wildfire [53]–[55].
The blackout model proposed in this paper can be further
extended for the future power system with high penetration
of renewable generation to evaluate the cascading failure risk,
identify critical components that play important roles in outage
initiating and propagation, and develop effective mitigation
strategies to significantly reduce the cascading risk.
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